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SECURITIES REGULATIONS INVESTIGATIONS-UNITED STATES-
Swiss TREATY ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE COOPERATION IN RE-
LEASING NAMES OF SWISS-BASED ACCOUNT HOLDERS INVOLVED
IN UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
INVESTIGATIONS
Secrecy laws of Switzerland, which protect the names of account
holders from release, present a major obstacle to the efforts of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)' in investigating al-
leged insider trading2 on the United States securities markets
through Swiss-based accounts. 3 The most recent problem involves
interpretation of the scope of a 1977 treaty4 between the United
States and Switzerland, and a 1982 memorandum of understand-
ing5 that clarified and expanded investigatory cooperation between
the two nations under the 1977 treaty. These two documents are
the vehicles for diplomatic cooperation between the two countries
in SEC investigations of insider trading alleged to have occurred
via Swiss accounts.' In July 1984, the SEC successfully relied on
the treaty and memorandum of understanding to persuade the
Swiss government to order five banks to divulge the identities of
' The Securities and Exchange Commission was established by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982)).
Its primary function is the protection of investors in securities. Quinn & Co. v. SEC, 452
F.2d 943, 947 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1971).
' "Insider trading" describes the act of purchasing or selling securities while in possession
of material, non-public information about an issuer or the trading market for an issuer's
securities. See 2 Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1037 (2d ed. 1961); Cary, Insider Trading in
Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009 (1966). Insider trading is illegal under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984) (rule 10b-
5), promulgated by the SEC.
3 In 1981, total foreign trading on American stock markets was $75 billion, approximately
$14.8 billion of which came from Swiss banks. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at 34, col. 6.
' Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzer-
land, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 916 [hereinafter cited as
Treaty].
5 U.S.-Swiss Memorandum on Insider Trading, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1737 (Oct.
8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
' These instruments are the means for voluntary cooperation by the Swiss. The SEC also
has the option to attempt to get information by court-ordered discovery procedures. See
infra note 34 and accompanying text. The primary emphasis of this Recent Development is
the viability of the treaty and memorandum for investigatory cooperation when the alleged
illegal trading was done through a Swiss brokerage house rather than a bank.
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certain account holders7 suspected of insider trading on Kuwait
Petroleum Corporation's purchase of Santa Fe International, an oil
and gas drilling concern.8 The SEC is currently conducting another
investigation of alleged insider trading involving more than twenty
Wall Street individuals, law firms, and securities firms.9 The SEC
suspects that this alleged insider trading may be the largest ever
encountered, involving over forty million dollars of illegal trading
profits."° As part of this investigation, the SEC is attempting to
obtain the identities of several account holders at Zurich-based El-
lis Ag. 11 Ellis is a brokerage-concern affiliate of the major private
Swiss bank, A. Sarasin & Cie. of Basel, and the SEC believes much
of the alleged inside trading was done through accounts handled
by Ellis.'2
Issues relating to the scope of the treaty and memorandum of
understanding surfaced in April 1984, when the Swiss Federal Of-
fice of Police refused to grant the SEC's first request,' 3 made pur-
suant to the treaty and memorandum, that Swiss authorities in-
struct Ellis to reveal the names behind the accounts involved in
the investigation.' The SEC then made a second request, also pur-
suant to the treaty and memorandum, on July 10."5 As of October
1, the Swiss had made no decision on this second request, and it
was uncertain when their response to the SEC would be forthcom-
ing.'" When the Federal Office of Police denied the April request,
Swiss authorities took the position that the treaty and memoran-
7 Swiss banks maintain "omnibus accounts" with brokerage houses in the United States,
which allow them to trade for their customers in the banks' names. Kelley, United States
Foreign Policy: Efforts to Penetrate Bank Secrecy in Switzerland from 1940 to 1975, 6 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 211, 237 (1976).
1 SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock, and Call Options for the
Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corporation, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99, 424 (S.D.N.Y.
July 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Santa Fe Case].
9 Metz, SEC Investigates Insider Trading on Takeover Bids, Wall St. J., July 23, 1984, at
2, col. 1.
10 Id.
1, Id. SEC Enforcement Director, John M. Fedders, first publicly confirmed the Ellis in-
vestigation on Sept. 19, 1984, but reports in the Wall Street Journal have stated that the
investigation has been underway for more than two years. Metz, supra note 9.
12 Id.
1" The United States Department of Justice formally made the request on behalf of the
SEC, as required by article 28 of the treaty. Treaty, supra note 4, ch. VII, art. 28.
14 Jorg Kistler, spokesman for the Swiss Federal Office of Police, characterized this re-
quest as "broad and informal." Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1984, at 7, col. 2.
15 Id. Mr. Kistler characterized the second request as more formal than the first; he also
stated that it "covers less ground" than the first request. Id.
14 Id.
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dum applied only to banks and, therefore, a bank affiliate such as
Ellis was not subject to the provisions of the two agreements. 17 El-
lis has since stated that it will cooperate with the SEC probe, but
only insofar as such cooperation complies with Swiss secrecy law
and the firm's responsibilities to its clients."8 In effect, this state-
ment indicates that any cooperation the SEC receives from Ellis
will come only at the instruction of the Swiss government. This
Recent Development examines the 1977 treaty and 1982 memoran-
dum of understanding, and the detrimental results to the SEC's
investigatory powers which will arise should the Swiss continue to
deny application of these agreements to brokers such as Ellis.
Insider trading refers to trading in the securities markets while
in possession of material information" that is not available to the
general public.20 Anyone who buys or sells securities based on such
non-public information is in violation of section 10b of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 of the SEC, promulgated pursu-
ant to the act.2' The SEC has the authority to initiate investiga-
tions as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has
violated or is about to violate these provisions.2" The SEC also has
authority to obtain temporary or permanent injunctions for dis-
gorgement of any profits made through illegal transactions, and for
civil monetary penalties of up to three times the profit gained or
loss avoided through illegal transactions." Criminal proceedings
17 Id.
Id.
" Material information has been defined as that to which a reasonable man would attach
importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question. T.S.C. Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Norway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
10 H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
355]. See also supra note 2. Insider trading often occurs in the context of a corporate
buyout; once the takeover intention is announced the value of the stock of the company to
be acquired may increase dramatically. An "insider" may be broadly defined as one who has
"access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available for a corporate pur-
pose and not for the personal benefit of anyone." Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982). For a complete list of the SEC's general rules and regulations,
see 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1984).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
23 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984). This
act is an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 1. The 1934 act,
through § 21(e), provided only for injunctions, but once the equity jurisdiction of a court
was established on a showing of a securities violation, the court obtained the power to fash-
ion an appropriate remedy. Disgorgement of the illegal profits was often the equitable relief
the SEC requested. H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 20, at 7. The penalties contained in the
1984 act are in addition to those existing under the 1934 act, giving the SEC more flexibility
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for violations of SEC rules and regulations are also possible, but
the SEC must transmit any evidence it has collected concerning
alleged violations to the Attorney General, who must initiate any
such proceedings.24
On May 25, 1973, the United States and Switzerland signed the
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.25 President
Ford presented the treaty to the Senate for ratification on Febru-
ary 18, 1976.28 In his message to the Senate, President Ford noted
that assistance from Switzerland in obtaining evidence and infor-
mation needed for criminal investigations was uniquely important
because of Switzerland's position as an international financial
center.27 President Ford also stated that despite previous general
cooperation from the Swiss, procedures for obtaining the needed
information had been "generally ponderous and inadequate." Fed-
eral officials also frequently encountered severe difficulties in ob-
taining information from Swiss banks due to banking secrecy
laws.28 The treaty, effective January 23, 1977, calls for compulsory
assistance in the investigation of crimes that are punishable under
the laws of the requesting and the requested states and are among
the thirty-five crimes listed in the treaty.29 Included in this list of
crimes is "[firaud, including obtaining money or securities by ...
any fraudulent means.""0 Insider trading per se, however, is not a
in terms of available remedies. Id. at 8. The 1984 act defines "profit gained or loss avoided"
to mean the difference between the purchase or sale price of the security and the trading
price of that security a reasonable period after public dissemination of the nonpublic infor-
mation. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, § 2 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 784). The
First Circuit followed this definition in SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983),
where disgorgement of the illegal profits was ordered in an action brought under the 1934
act and rule 10b-5.
24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(e) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)
(1982)). The maximum penalty for any individual is a $100,000 fine, Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984, § 3 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78ff), and/or a five-year prison term. 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1982).
2" Treaty, supra note 4. The President ratified the treaty on July 10, 1976; Swiss ratifica-
tion was on July 7, 1976. The treaty entered into force on January 23, 1977.
"' President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Treaty for Advice and Consent to
Ratification, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 234 (Feb. 18, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Presi-
dent's Message].
17 Id. Switzerland is the third largest financial center in the world behind New York and
London.
2 President's Message, supra note 26. President Ford also stated that the treaty was the
first major international agreement by the United States aimed at obtaining information
and evidence needed for criminal investigations and prosecutions. Id.
" Treaty, supra note 4, art. 4, schedule, 27 U.S.T. at 2028-29, 2064-67.
Id. schedule, 27 U.S.T. at 2065.
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criminal offense punishable under the laws of Switzerland.31 In ad-
dition, the language of the treaty, while not explicitly excluding
other types of institutions, refers to a "bank" and does not men-
tion brokers.32
On November 16, 1981, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York issued an order compelling Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana (BSI)3" to divulge the names of its undis-
closed principals involved in an SEC insider trading investiga-
tion.34 Shortly thereafter, in March and August 1982, the United
States and Switzerland met again to discuss mutually acceptable
means of improving international law enforcement cooperation in
the field of insider trading. 35 Swiss authorities, prompted by the
fear of future United States court action similar to the BSI case,3"
agreed to a memorandum of understanding regarding the 1977
treaty at these meetings.37 In the memorandum, the Swiss agreed
that insider trading could be an offense under Articles 148 (fraud),
159 (unfaithful management), or 162 (violations of business
secrets) of the Swiss Penal Code.38 The Swiss further agreed that
when an insider trading investigation also includes an allegation
3' Insider trading, though not illegal per se in Switzerland, is considered unethical. The
Swiss consider the practice an "administrative" problem rather than a crime. Memorandum,
supra note 5, at 1738.
32 Treaty, supra note 4, art. 10, § 2.
3 BSI is a Swiss bank which transacts business on United States securities markets. SEC
v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
"' Banca Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 111. This case was an SEC action against a Swiss bank
and unnamed others for an injunction and an accounting for violating insider trading provi-
sions. The SEC also sought to compel discovery of the names of the other parties. While
making no mention of the treaty or the memorandum, the court followed a line of case law
regarding compelling discovery where foreign law prohibits the requested disclosure. The
court applied a balancing test, considering such factors as the good faith of the party re-
sisting discovery, the illegality of disclosing such information under the foreign law, and
what view, if any, the foreign government had expressed in the case. Id. at 114-15. The court
also seemed to come very near a nexus approach as well, stating in its conclusion: "It would
be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade American markets, violate
American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist accountability for
itself and its principals for the illegality by claiming their anonymity under foreign law." Id.
at 119.
32 Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1737. SEC representatives in the United States delega-
tion included among others, John M. Fedders, Director of the Division of Enforcement, and
Edward F. Greene, General Counsel. Id.
"0 The memorandum specifically mentioned that the United States and Swiss representa-
tives entered into discussions "of concerns in both countries with respect to recent cases
involving persons who used Swiss banks as intermediaries to effect securities transactions in
the United States" based on inside information. Id. at 1738.
37 Id.
I8 d.
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that the Swiss Penal Code has been violated, compulsory measures
can be had under the treaty to assist the SEC in obtaining infor-
mation.39 This part of the memorandum also refers to obtaining
information from "banks" that act on behalf of their clients in se-
curities transactions in the United States.'0 The memorandum fur-
ther provides that the Swiss Federal Council will submit to the
Parliament a bill making insider trading per se illegal under Swiss
law.4' The parties discussed the feasibility of using a private agree-
ment of the Swiss Banker's Association 2 as a means of handling
requests for information by the SEC in the interim pending the
passage of the bill. 3 The private agreement language is similarly
flawed, however, in that it refers only to "banks" with no reference
to brokers.44
The record of cooperation under the agreements is disappointing
in that the only instance in which the SEC successfully relied on
the treaty and memorandum to persuade the Swiss government to
order disclosure of principals involved in insider trading has been
the Santa Fe case,'5 which did involve banks. In Santa Fe, the
SEC, acting through the United States Department of Justice,"
requested information from the Swiss Federal Office of Police on
3" Id.
40 Id.
" Id. at 1738-39. On November 16, 1983, the Swiss government officially announced it
would submit to its Parliament legislation that would make insider trading a criminal of-
fense under the Swiss Penal Code. A spokesman for the Swiss Ministry of Justice and Police
stated that it had begun the usual procedure of consulting the cantonal governments, politi-
cal parties, and other groups, specifically the banking industry, before any major bill is sub-
mitted to Parliament. This process was expected to last until early 1984, with the bill going
to Parliament late that year, and if passed, enacted in 1985. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1983, at
D6, col. 3.
42 Agreement XVI of the Swiss Banker's Association with Regard to the Handling of Re-
quests for Information from the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States
on the Subject of Misuse of Inside Information, 22 I.L.M. 7 (1983), 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1740 (Oct. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Private Agreement].
'3 The private agreement calls for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry for the
Board of Directors of the Swiss Banker's Association to handle SEC inquiries on the misuse
of inside information pursuant to certain conditions set out in the private agreement. The
Commission may furnish the requested information to the SEC; however, the conditions and
limitations contained in the private agreement have raised questions regarding what practi-
cal benefit it will actually be to the SEC in insider trading investigations. For a discussion of
the limits of the private agreement, see Insider Trading Laws and Swiss Banks: Recent
Hope for Reconciliation, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 315 (1984).
'" Private Agreement, supra note 42.
45 Santa Fe Case, supra note 8.
4' The treaty provides that requests for assistance must be handled by the Attorney Gen-
eral or his designee. Treaty, supra note 4, art. 28, 27 U.S.T. at 2050.
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March 22, 1982.17 The Federal Office of Police determined that the
request met the requirements set out in the treaty and issued an
order for the banks involved to disclose the identities of the princi-
pals behind the accounts under investigation.4" The banks initially
appealed this order back to the Federal Office of Police, which af-
firmed its earlier decision.49 A subsequent appeal to the Swiss Su-
preme Court followed, which originally resulted in a reversal in the
banks' favor.50 This ruling was short-lived, however, because the
court subsequently issued an order directing the banks to release
the information to the SEC. 1 This ruling marked the first time the
SEC had received such assistance from the Swiss courts.52
The issue presented by the Ellis investigation - whether the
Swiss will recognize bank-affiliated brokers as being subject to the
terms of the treaty and memorandum - will be a barometer of
Swiss attitudes concerning the whole secrecy issue."3 Given that se-
crecy plays a vital role in Switzerland's attractiveness to inves-
tors,5 4 and that secrecy has been the norm since World War II," it
should be no surprise that the Swiss favor a restrictive interpreta-
" Switzerland: Swiss Supreme Court Opinion Concerning Judicial Assistance in the Santa
Fe Case, 22 I.L.M. 785 (1983) [reproduced from an English summary prepared by Charles




" Wall St. J., July 16, 1984, at 42, col. 4.
5 Id.
13 The SEC has found the Swiss government often unwilling to cooperate with its investi-
gations. In a case similar to the Ellis investigation involving Marc Rich and Pincus Green,
the two principal officers of a Swiss commodity trading concern, the Swiss government not
only refused to extradite the two to the United States for prosecution, but also seized cer-
tain documents of the company to keep such documents out of the United States courts.
Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1984, at 30, col. 1. The Swiss banking industry is also hostile to any
unilateral attempts by the SEC to solve the secrecy problem. Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1984, at 35,
col. 1. Indications are, however, that Swiss attitudes may be moving closer to those of the
SEC, as evidenced by the Santa Fe Case, supra note 8, and the possibility that the Parlia-
ment may pass a bill making insider trading a crime in Switzerland. Memorandum, supra
note 5, at 1738.
" Switzerland's history of political stability also enhances its attractiveness over other
countries with similar secrecy laws. As of November 1, 1982, 26 countries had banking se-
crecy laws, and 22 countries maintained "blocking laws," which impede judicial or adminis-
trative proceedings by restricting testimony or production of documents for use in such pro-
ceedings. Outline by John M. Fedders, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities
and Exchange Commission, in preparation for an address before the Tenth Annual Securi-
ties Regulation Institute, University of California, San Diego, January 1983, at 23 (material
dated Nov. 1, 1982).
68 For a discussion of the history of Swiss banking secrecy, see Meyer, Swiss Banking
Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18 (1978).
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tion of these agreements. The exclusion of institutions such as Ellis
from the scope of the treaty and memorandum would mark a ma-
jor setback for the SEC in its attempts to crack down on what it
sees as an increasing problem of insider trading. 6 If the Swiss de-
cline to furnish assistance on investigations of securities transac-
tions conducted through institutions such as Ellis, any party that
intended to trade based on inside information would certainly
work the transaction through such a "non-bank" institution to
avoid SEC prosecution. Furthermore, the possibility of further
United States court decisions similar to Banca Italiana57 should
indicate to the Swiss that United States courts may no longer be
willing to tolerate foreign secrecy laws that shield parties which
violate United States securities laws in transactions on United
States exchanges.
By acknowledging that Swiss brokers should be subject to the
treaty and memorandum, the Swiss government could promote
goodwill with the United States while at the same time enhancing
the integrity of its own financial network. In granting SEC re-
quests for information in cases such as Ellis, Switzerland could
send a message to the financial world that it is serious about coop-
eration with the SEC on insider investigations and will no longer
be a haven for securities law violators.
Daniel B. Simon III
Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation, Hearings on H.R. 559
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983) (written statement
of John S.R. Shad, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
" Banca Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 111.
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